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Restitution Without Context: An Examination of 
the Losing Contract Problem in the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution 
 






In his 1959 article ‘Restitution in Context’, Stewart Macaulay reviewed a casebook on 
restitution and wondered whether the subject could be considered by itself, outside of the 
far broader context in which restitution cases usually arise. Thus began a long career of 
considering legal phenomena within their broader settings: without context, one might 
well lose nuance essential to understanding a subject.    
                                                 
* Many thanks go to Alice Abreu, Rick Greenstein, Greg Mandel and Amy Sinden for their comments on an 
earlier draft and to the late John Kidwell for his extensive support and editing help with earlier drafts. The 
author also thanks Temple University for research support. 
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 In 2011, restitution was once again isolated as a subject, this time by the 
American Law Institute, which gave final approval to a Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (hereinafter R3RUE). Thus culminated a very long 
project of identifying a field for ‘restating’, reviewing the cases and commentary about 
the field, drafting black letter and commentary, and securing approval for the project from 
the membership of the American Law Institute.
1
 
 This Restatement project offers an opportunity to revisit the insights about the 
importance of context that Macaulay made in 1959. The focus here will be on a 
particularly difficult contract remedies problem where contract law and restitution 
historically have been thought to overlap—the losing contract problem. Simply stated, 
can a person who has made a losing contract (contracting to give more than he will get) 
recover damages for breach that disregard a loss on the bargain, the risk of which the non-
breacher implicitly agreed to when he made the contract. R3RUE treats that problem very 
differently from the treatment given to the same problem by the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. My contention is that if we examine this same problem through a variety of 
contexts—real, experimental, theoretical, and practical—the solution proposed by the 
new Restatement may lack normative support, but it will, nonetheless, be very hard to 
predict whether it will appeal to the judiciary, which is, after all, the audience to whom a 
Restatement provision is primarily directed. 
 Section I will introduce the R3RUE project, lay out the losing contract problem 
using a simple hypothetical, and then briefly outline different approaches to it, including 
the complex solution proposed in the new Restatement of Restitution. Section II will then 
consider the problem in the wider contexts of actual, observed contracting behaviour 
pioneered by Stewart Macaulay and of newer work that examines how experimental 
subjects regard contract obligation and breach. Both of these contexts reveal a ‘reciprocity 
                                                 
1
 The process of creating a Restatement is described in M Shapo, ‘In Search of the Law of Products 
Liability: The ALI Restatement Project’ (1995) 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 631.   
 norm’ that may animate the behaviour of those who make and perform contracts. When 
used as a starting point in a normative instrumental analysis of the problem, the 
reciprocity norm can produce outcomes at odds with a conventional parallel analysis that 
does not take that norm into account.  
 Section III will situate this problem within a different context: contract doctrine 
itself. R3RUE regards the losing contract problem as having a ‘contract solution’ and 
proceeds to define that solution using a particular vision of contract law. This conception 
is sharply distinguished from the broad idea of restitution that otherwise animates 
R3RUE, and this particular vision takes scant account of the reciprocity that is endemic to 
all but a narrow range of contracts. Section III will conclude by showing that this 
particular vision of contract law contributes strongly to the solution to the losing contract 
problem found in R3RUE and that a different vision, one that takes greater account of 
reciprocity, may well account for the different treatment given to the same problem in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
 Having suggested that our views about contract law may have changed during the 
30 years between these restatement projects and that those views may well contribute to 
the different solutions to the same problem that we find in those two Restatement 
projects, we come to the uneasy conclusion in Section III that the ‘right’ solution as a 
normative matter may depend on how one looks at the problem and, in particular, on the 
extent to which we believe that the reciprocity norm is an important one in contract law.    
 Finally, Section IV will consider how the new rule might be received in the world 
of the courts as well as whether it might have effects outside the litigation system. Here it 
will be suggested that the rule may actually operate differently from the rule supported by 
most of the supporting commentary in R3RUE. This will result in substantial uncertainty 
that could in turn have the unintended effect (if it has any effects at all) of motivating the 
parties to modify their ongoing contracts rather than face the uncertainties of litigation. In 
this respect, the ‘success’ of the new rule will be in the eye of the beholder. 
  
I.  The Losing Contract Problem and R3RUE’s Proposed Solution 
 
At its Annual Meeting in 2010 the American Law Institute (ALI) approved R3RUE, a 
project led by its reporter professor Andrew Kull. Both the ALI and Professor Kull have 
reason to be proud of their ambitious 10-year effort to synthesise a wide and unruly field. 
 By its very nature, a Restatement isolates a legal field for ‘restating’ a narrowing 
activity that, as Macaulay observed in 1959, carries with it the potential to distort by 
removing context. The project recognized that restitution and contract often overlap 
where courts have purported to create a ‘quasi contract’ or ‘restitution’ solution to a 
problem involving a contract that failed. In an important subdivision of the Restatement, 
the project considers the use of restitution in such contract settings.
2
 It is here one finds a 
section addressing restitution for services provided when the provider and recipient 
disagree whether the contract requires them,
3
 restitution of profits from a breacher who 
has committed an ‘opportunistic breach’4 and the extent to which a person in a losing 
contract can get restitution of benefits conferred on the breacher without regard to a 
potential loss on the bargain.
5
  
 This last is surely one of the most difficult problems addressed by the project and 
may well be most revealing of the project’s underlying assumptions and ideas. The 
                                                 
2
 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment (St Paul, ALI, 2011) (hereinafter R3RUE) ch 4 
§§ 31–39 (entitled ‘Restitution and Contract’). 
3
 R3RUE § 35. 
4
 R3RUE § 39. 
5
 R3RUE § 38. 
 traditional rule, as set out in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373, permits the 
plaintiff who has made a losing contract to recover from the breacher the reasonable value 
of the benefits conferred on the breacher without regard to the bargain loss implicit in the 
original bargain.
6
 The rule was controversial when the Restatement was drafted,
7
 but the 
ALI elected then to follow the majority rule in the case law. While the case law had not 
changed appreciably in the interim,
8
 R3RUE changed this rule
9
 to one where the losing 
party will always absorb in a damages award some of the loss on the original bargain. 
Though there was scant support for change in the case law, the change was consistent 
with newly-dominant scholarly commentary supporting some form of reversal of the 
rule.
10
 But it remains to be seen whether the change is a sound one as a matter of policy 
and, perhaps more practically, whether courts, mired in context as they usually are, will 
recognize it. While its latest incarnation is in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, the 
losing contract rule raises questions that lie near the core of contract law and offers an 




 The easiest way to dig into the question is through a simple problem. Suppose 
Dimwitted Contractor contracts to build Owner a house for the price of $150,000. 
Whether desperate for work in the recession, overly optimistic about his own costs, or 
                                                 
6
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (St Paul, ALI, 1981) § 373(1) and cmt a. 
7
 See 56th ALI Proceedings (1979) 406–12. 
8
 Recent cases are collected in G Palmer and L Kaplan, Law of Restitution (2011 Cum Supp) (Wolters 
Kluwer) § 4.4(a), n 7a. 
9
 The issue was settled in 2003. 
10
 See authorities cited in R3RUE § 38 Reporter’s Note d. 
11
 The Reporter has gathered much of the scholarly commentary on the rule in R3RUE § 38 Reporter's Note 
d. To the Reporter's list, one must add, at least, the excellent article supporting the traditional approach by B 
Gegan, ‘In Defense Of Restitution: A Comment on Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: 
The Case Of The Partially Performing Seller’ (1984) 57 Southern California Law Review 723. 
 just plain stupid, Contractor has seriously underpriced the construction. The value of what 
the contractor has agreed to do and what other contractors would charge for the same job 
is $200,000 and it will cost the contractor that much to do the work. Owner knows she 
drove a hard bargain and is getting a great deal (a $200,000 job for $150,000 or a gain of 
$50,000). Even better from owner’s perspective, she has negotiated a payment schedule 
that requires her to pay half the price ($75,000) when the job is 80 per cent complete and 
the other half when it is completed. When Contractor has done precisely 80 per cent of 
work (at a cost of $160,000), Owner refuses to pay anything at all and ejects him from the 
job, asserting a substantial breach by Contractor as the reason. This act, in fact, 
constitutes Owner’s substantial breach of the contract and we can assume a court would 
so hold. How should we measure the contractor’s recovery? 
 This question has puzzled courts and commentators for more than a century. Were 
we to award the contractor’s ‘expectation damages’, we would put the contractor into the 
position he would have been in if the contract were fully performed.
12
 In an 80 per cent 
completed contract like this, it would mean we would award the amount the owner did 
not pay, $150,000 minus the contractor’s ‘loss avoided’ ($40,000), or $110,00013 for the 
$160,000 worth of work completed.
14
 An ‘expectation damages’ award would preserve 
the integrity of the original bargain, since the contractor should be seen as having 
bargained at the outset to lose $50,000 if he completed the entire job. One who asserted 
the sanctity and primacy of the contract that was negotiated would take this approach.
15
 
                                                 
12
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 cmt b. 
13
 Our contractor avoided 20% of the $200,000 worth of work due to the owner’s breach, so under the 
expectation measure he should get the contract price, $150,000 minus (0.2 x $200,000) = $110,000 as a 
final payment for the work done.  
14
 eg, Restatement (Second) Contracts § 347; compare Restatement (Second) Contracts § 373. 
15
 This ‘full expectation’ treatment was advocated in H Mather, ‘Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of 
Contract: The Case of the Partially Performing Seller’ (1982) 92 Yale Law Journal 14. 
  An alternative way of looking at it is to consider the owner’s substantial breach to 
be the equivalent of the end of the bargain. Why, one might ask, should a breacher be 
effectively entitled to her profit when she induced the contractor’s work by making her 
own promise but then did not then earn her own profit by fully performing the contract? 
Promises were, of course, exchanged. But in a contract setting, the promisor did not make 
a promise ‘to’ herself but made it ‘to’ another person in the context of a bargain. Each 
promise was conditional on, and made in anticipation of—in reliance on—actually 
receiving what the other side promised. Indeed, a fair reading in nearly any case is that the 
parties were bargaining for the performances the promises represented, not simply for the 
substitutional relief value that a later trier of fact might place on the promises; an award 
of expectation damages is but one of many ways to measure that loss of the anticipated 
performance.
16
 On this view, by destroying the reciprocal context in which the promise 
was made, a substantial breach has destroyed the only reason to use the bargain as a point 
of reference for damages. Having removed the implications of the bargain, this view 
continues, what remains to be done is to assess damages for the owner’s breach. Since the 
expectation measure is itself but an approximation of real damages, there is no essential 
reason to use expectation as a limit on what the loser might obtain. And since the winner 
actually received some of the performance contemplated, the reasonable value of which 
would be easy for the winner to estimate and factor in at the making of the bargain,
17
 
there is little danger of throwing onto the winner an unknowable risk that might have 
produced the loser’s bad bargain if that ‘reasonable value’ were used. Under those 
circumstances, awarding the value of the work done is an acceptable solution. 
                                                 
16
 Professor Corbin saw the remedy not as a remedy for unjust enrichment but rather as a simple alternative 
way to measure injury. See A Corbin, Corbin On Contracts, vol 5 (St Paul, West Publishing, 1950) § 1106.  
17
 Certainly it would be easier for the winner to estimate this figure than it is to estimate the consequential 
damages that might result from the winner’s breaching the contract.   
  This ‘reasonable value’ approach (however we might articulate its theory) would 
give the contractor $160,000, effectively erasing the implications of the bad bargain he 
made. At the same time, it does not preserve the benefit of the bargain for a party who, 
after all, did not earn that benefit through full performance. This approach, adopted by 
most courts in the twentieth century but questioned by many commentators, was, after 
strong debate,
18
 enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
19
 There are also two 
solutions that might be regarded as compromises, somewhere between ‘expectation 
damages’ and ‘reasonable value’. One approach would award ‘reasonable value’ but 
would limit the owner’s liability to the total price she agreed to—here, $150,000.20  
 R3RUE takes still a different mid-way approach, creating the ‘contract rate rule’, 
an approach recognized by a few nineteenth-century courts (and, in sales of goods cases, 
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
21
 In the simple example above, R3RUE 
would provide that plaintiff contractor should be paid at the contract rate. Here, that 
would give the contractor 80 per cent of the contract price—0.8 x $150,000, or 
                                                 
18
 ALI Proceedings (n 7). 
19
 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 373. The new Restatement of Restitution does preserve in § 37 one 
variation of the Restatement of Contracts solution: If a buyer of goods or services has prepaid on a losing 
contract and the supplier has failed to deliver any performance, the buyer can get his money back without 
any deduction for having made a bad bargain. This result follows Bush v Canfield, 2 Conn 485 (CT 1818), a 
well-known case reaching that result. R3RUE preserves this particular outcome by introducing ‘rescission’, 
a remedy that simply reverses the transaction (and therefore gives the buyer restitution of the down payment 
without any deduction for loss on the bargain). Rescission is not available once values need to be 
established for a part performance—where the court cannot ‘unscramble the egg’. A Kull, ‘Rescission and 
Restitution’ (2006) 61 Business Lawyer 569, 577. R3RUE’s narrow rescission remedy would thus not be 
available in the example discussed in the text.  
20
 See Johnson v Bovee, 574 P2d 513 (Colo Ct App 1978); Wuchter v Fitzgerald, 163 P 819 (OR 1917). 
21
 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(1). A ‘contract rate’ approach is also sometimes used in employment 
contract cases; see G Palmer, Law of Restitution, vol 1, § 4.4 (Wolters Kluwer) 394. 
 $120,000.
22
 This preserves some of the contract’s profit/loss allocation, but only that 
portion that ‘accrued’ during the actual performance of the contract; the owner earns her 
pro rata profit up to the time she breaches but not afterward. This solution was found in a 




 In rejecting the conventional judicial solution to this problem, R3RUE bends to a 
chorus of modern academic commentators that viewed the ‘reasonable value’ solution as 
‘unjustly enriching’ the contractor24 (mostly because it ignored the contractor’s loss on 
the bargain) and rejects the views of earlier contracts scholars such as Corbin and Fuller 
and restitution scholar Palmer. It also rejects the ‘expectation damages’ solution, one that 
preserves the full expectancy of both breacher and non-breacher and is, perhaps, most 
logically in accord with what one might view as the parties’ initial bargain. 
 Perhaps because it is a compromise, there is something intuitively appealing about 
the Restatement’s ‘contract rate’ solution to the problem. After all, these parties did make 
a bargain and, assuming no invalidity on account of duress, mistake, or unconscionability, 
it is perhaps safe to assume that the values they may have placed on their commitments 
ought to survive anyone’s breach. On the other hand, allowing the breacher to preserve 
the whole benefit of that bargain with little or no performance seems wrong. The 
contractor bargained for an actual, full performance, not a partial one; and he certainly 
wasn’t simply making a bet.25 
                                                 
22
 R3RUE § 38(2)(b).  
23
 The main cases supporting illustrations in the Restatement's new rule include Kehoe v Rutherford, 27 A 
912 (NJ 1893), Doolittle & Chamberlain v McCullough, 12 Ohio St 369 (OH 1861), and Noyes v Pugin, 27 
P 548 (WA 1891). 
24
 R3RUE § 38 cmt d.   
25
 See Corbin, Corbin On Contracts (n 16). 
  That the new Restatement has rejected what seemed to be the reasonably settled 
majority view of the courts during the bulk of the twentieth century and replaced it with a 
very innovative, but not widely followed compromise position reflected in a few 
nineteenth-century cases is itself interesting. In the process, the ‘situation sense’,26 or 
context,
27
 that twentieth-century courts may have brought to the problem has been 
displaced by judicial visions of contract law from an earlier era and by academic 
commentary of a century later. If the Restatement's solution has replaced one reached 
within rich factual contexts with one reached through detached theory, it is one that 
Macaulay has taught us could be suspect.   
 
II.  Instrumental Analyses of the Problem  
 
This Section considers the losing contract problem in the context of empirical research 
into the behaviour of those who make and perform contracts. It does so by taking findings 
from an area of that research and inserting them into an instrumental analysis of the kind 
used to support the new losing contract rule formulated by the Restatement. Instrumental 
analysis in legal discourse is ubiquitous; it may be no coincidence that it has also proven 
to be extraordinarily malleable. As one might expect, an instrumental analysis that is 
begun with different premises or assumptions is likely to produce different outcomes. 
 
                                                 
26
 See K Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1960) 
121–57.   
27
 S Macaulay, ‘Restitution in Context’ (1959) 107 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1133. 
 A.  Instrumental Analysis and Assumed Party Behaviour  
At the core of the instrumental analysis condemning the old ‘reasonable value rule’ is a 
prediction about how contractors will behave under it. The instrumental analysis starts 
with assumed contractor behaviour, proceeds to the conclusion that the traditional rule is 
‘inefficient’ and that, in turn, leads to a normative conclusion that the rule ought to be 
changed. We consider here the validity of that initial behavioural prediction within the 
wider context of empirical work of the kind pioneered by Macaulay together with newer 
experimental work that extends Macaulay’s empirical work.   
 In the context of our hypothetical problem, the instrumental analysis begins with 
the premise that our dimwitted Contractor, stuck in the midst of performing a losing 
contract, will react to his situation by responding solely to economic incentives and 
behave strategically by finding a way to induce the other side to breach.
28
 He will do this 
under the current rules allowing restitution for breach because he will then recover more 
in the ensuing litigation: the ‘reasonable value’ of his performance rather than a recovery 
limited in some way by the breacher’s less generous promise. What is worse, the 
‘reasonable value rule’, it is said, encourages this kind of strategic behaviour and is 
inefficient because the parties will expend resources trying to enhance their litigation 
position rather than finding an appropriate contract modification.
29
 And since, it is said, 
the parties would not choose such a rule at the outset,
30
 setting the ‘reasonable value rule’ 
as a default rule would be inefficient because it would require the parties to negotiate a 
change in this inefficient rule, or be stuck with it, in their contracts. 
                                                 
28
 A Kull, ‘Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract’ (1994) 67 Southern California Law Review 
1465, 1472; M Gergen, ‘Restitution and Contract: Comments on the Third Restatement’ (2005) 13 
Restitution Law Review 224, 237; compare D Laycock, Modern American Remedies, 4th edn (New York, 
Aspen Publishing, 2010) 693 fn 4.  
29
 Kull, ‘Restitution as a Remedy’ (n 28) 1472. 
30
 ibid 1517. 
  This abstract analysis is demonstrably malleable. For example, a similar kind of 
abstract ‘efficiency’ analysis that could support the opposite normative conclusion (that 
is, support the current majority rule) would simply denominate the losing contract rule a 
‘penalty default rule.’ To illustrate, let us assume that the parties would respond 
predictably to strict economic incentives and, therefore, would predictably engage in 
strategic behaviour. The prescient parties to the contract would know that undesirable 
remedial incentives would develop during performance. This knowledge would 
encourage them to negotiate around this ‘bad’ rule at the outset and thereby avoid the 
undesirable (and inefficient) judicial intervention about remedy at the litigation stage of 
their relationship.
31
 A party-crafted solution, the argument would go, is inevitably 
superior to (that is, more efficient than) any general rule developed by the legal system. 
The parties’ knowledge of and desire to avoid the government-imposed default rule 
would encourage them to develop a more efficient, individualized solution.    
 Because this kind of instrumental analysis is so easily manipulated, it is ultimately 
indeterminate as a normative matter. However, even if it were less indeterminate, abstract 
instrumental analysis begs the question whether it can offer much guidance at all in this 
complex setting. Unlike those provided by, say, a tax rule (for example, charitable 
contributions are deductible), the incentives imagined here are required to operate within 
highly-variable, unique, rich relational contexts where even if the incentives were 
accurately imagined, they compete with other incentives operating on the parties, such as 
the contractor’s concern for business reputation, the availability of other options for the 
owner, the delay occasioned by a breakdown in the contract and so on.
32
 Moreover, the 
analysis ignores the substantial transaction costs of the litigation alternative, as well as the 
potential for consequential damages, and assumes that the expectancy will be ‘the same’ 
                                                 
31
 See generally I Ayres and R Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87. 
32
 Compare K Llewellyn, ‘What Price Contract’ (1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 704; S Macaulay, ‘The Use 
and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry’ (1963) 9 Practical Lawyer 14.  
 whether it is delivered through a profitable performance by the losing contractor or 
through contract damages awarded to the winning owner in the win or lose litigation. 
Such assumptions are, of course, extremely unrealistic. The relational forces one can 
expect to operate in this context, and the transaction costs of litigation (not to mention the 
other unrecoverable losses implicated in a failed contract) may well dwarf other values 
that might be in play and, if taken into account, suggest that, whatever the rule, it may 
have little effect on the behaviour of the parties within the troubled contract.
33
 Except 
where the bargain is very large and extremely unbalanced in the winner’s favour, the 
‘winner’ will likely be economically better off with (and motivated towards) a successful 
negotiation regardless of the rule.  
 But even if one downplays the substantial noise produced by the complicated set 
of forces operating on the parties when a relational contract is in trouble, the incentives 
produced within that context by the current losing contract rule might well generate 
collaborative rather than self-interested responses. If the incentives produced by the 
losing contract rule work differently than imagined, the acontextual analysis that proceeds 
from it (whatever it may be worth) may be faulty.   
 At the core of the ‘noise-free’ normative economic analysis described is the 
implicit empirical assertion that people actually behave in the way the abstract model 
assumes. An implication is that reform through a different (more efficient) rule will 
prompt people to behave differently (and, one must assume, more efficiently). Someone 
following Macaulay and searching for real-world context might well ask: ‘Is that really 
how someone performing a losing contract will behave?’ If initial assumptions about 
human behaviour control the ultimate normative prescription, and if the goal is actually 
                                                 
33
 R Woodward and W Woodward, ‘Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Study’ (1983) 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 53 (finding that the predicted incentive effects on the 
rate of consumer bankruptcy filings from high and low state exemption provisions were not sustained by the 
data). 
 achieving efficient results in the real world, then we ought to get more valid prescriptions 
from an analysis that is better grounded in actual human behaviour. Actual human 
behaviour is, obviously, responsive to context; it will respond to whatever incentives the 
losing contract rule actually provides within the context of relatively long-term, relational 
contracts. Those contracts tend to be personal, unique and complex, on the other end of 
the contractual spectrum from swaps and other contracts that are only about shifting risks. 
 While one must be extremely sceptical that any rule will have real incentive 
effects on the parties within this context, a slight variation in initial assumptions tends to 
press in favour of the ‘reasonable value rule’. Consider a different contractor stuck in the 
same losing contract, but this time with just a little more context added in. Once this 
contractor discovered he was operating at a loss, he might approach the owner to begin a 
negotiation. One could imagine many reasons for what has evolved into a losing contract 
for the contractor—post-contract component price increases, weather problems, labour 
problems—that many would consider good reasons to open a negotiation aimed at a price 
adjustment (advantage-taking at the formation stage must be eliminated since this 
modeling assumes that both parties are fully knowledgeable, have equal bargaining power 
and so on). Many (if not most) owners, when faced with such a contractor, would in a real 
construction contract find it in their best interests to reach an accommodation. No owner 
wants to live with a construction job delivered by an unhappy or angry contractor—there 
are too many undetectable ways for a contractor to skimp on quality or otherwise frustrate 
the value of its performance. Put differently, if trust between the parties to a relational 
contract is broken, even if the owner gets some kind of performance, he might well not 
receive a reliable product.    
 If one imagined that the contractor’s first move would be to approach the owner 
for a concession, rather than cutting corners, simply walking away, or strategically 
inducing the owner into breaching, then perhaps the situation would call for a rule that 
would encourage a collaborative adjustment of the losing contract in order to avoid its 
collapse. This would, at minimum, avoid the deadweight costs of non-consensual, 
 governmental dispute resolution.
34
 If one begins a rational actor analysis in a slightly 
different place, one might well come to an entirely different normative outcome. 
 We can test the available ways to address the losing contract problem by 
considering the likelihood of a consensual contract price modification when initiated by 
the losing contractor in the midst of performance of the contract in order to avoid a 
breakdown of the contract. Assuming that rules could produce some effect on the 
behaviour of the parties in this context, what incentive effects might be imagined from 
the current rules embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts? Under those rules, 
the winner-owner obtains the gain on the bargain if the loser-contractor has materially 
breached
35
 but loses that gain (and the contractor avoids that loss) if the winner-owner 
has materially breached.
36
 These rules may actually have the effect of motivating an 
adjustment in order to avoid collapse of the contract, once the loser opens negotiations. 
These traditional rules create a downside for each of the parties should the litigation go 
the wrong way for them, a corresponding upside if the litigation goes right, and 
substantial uncertainty about which it will eventually be. Because of the uncertainty 
implicit in these rules, both parties will be motivated to reach a modification in order to 
avoid a breakdown of the contract and the hard-to-consensually-resolve dispute that will 
                                                 
34
 See, eg I Macneil, ‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 947. 
Professor Macneil argued that an individualistic, non-relational perspective produces ‘inefficient’ outcomes. 
In critiquing simple law and economics reasoning epitomised by efficient breach analysis, he wrote: ‘The 
bias against cooperation demonstrated by the simple-efficient-breach theory should surprise no one familiar 
with the neoclassical model. Such a bias is not limited to this particular fallacy, but is one towards which the 
neoclassical model inevitably and always tends. That model postulates individuals acting as if the relations 
in which those individuals exist have no effect on their behavior. Cooperative behavior postulates relations. 
A model assuming away relations slips with the greatest of ease at any stage into favoring uncooperative 
andironically enoughhighly inefficient human behavior.’ 
ibid 969. 
35
 Restatement (Second) Contracts §§ 347, 349. 
36
 ibid § 373.   
 follow. And while both parties may have some reason to strategize in this setting, this 
motivation pales in comparison with their motivation to keep the contract going and 
avoid the uncertainties of litigation. 
 Again, recognizing that whatever incentive effects the rules might produce are 
likely to be overwhelmed by the ‘noise’ of the situation, the full expectancy rule as 
embodied in Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 347–48 (where the gain or loss on the 
bargain was fully allocated at contract formation and did not vary at all depending on who 
breached) would seem to produce less reason to consensually modify the ongoing 
contract. Under this rule, the winner ‘wins’ her expectation regardless of who breached or 
where in the performance the contract broke down. In this hypothetically ‘noise-free’ 
environment, the ‘winner’ has little downside to holding out—she gets the same 
expectancy, either through actual performance if the loser sticks it out, through contract 
damages if the winner wins on the breach question, and through a deduction of that same 
expectation amount from the loser’s damages if she loses on the breach question. If the 
contract breaks down and a dispute ensues, it will be relatively easy (less costly) to 
resolve since nothing would depend on who breached first. This is consistent with the 
view that the contract defines all obligations at the point of contract formation and that 
post-formation flexibility is either beside the point or undesirable. Professor Henry 
Mather advanced this view based not on economic analysis (which he viewed as 
inconclusive) but on a libertarian idea that the law should strive towards minimal 
coercion and that liability should follow only from consent.
37
 
 R3RUE’s new ‘contract rate rule’, a hybrid of the two extremes, would at first 
blush seem to lie somewhere between the two in its tendency to promote a contract 
adjustment, since it ultimately produces a sliding scale of economic incentive. Like the 
‘reasonable value rule’, its operation, too, depends on who is ultimately identified as the 
‘first material breacher’. If the loser is the breacher, the economic result is the same as it 
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 is under the Restatement of Contracts: reliance damages minus the victim-winner’s full 
expectation under the contract.
38
 But if the winner is the breacher, the rule is more 
complicated than the traditional rule. Under the ‘contract rate rule’, the winner would 
secure a fraction of her profit (that part represented by the percentage of the contract that 
is complete) if she were found to be the breacher.
39
 So, while material breach continues to 
be central to triggering that rule, the stakes that ride on the question become smaller the 
further along the contract proceeds in performance. 
 If the contract is 90 per cent complete at the time it breaks down, for example, the 
winner will recover 90 per cent of her expectancy if she is found to be the breacher and 
100 per cent if the loser has breached. This gives the winning owner less economic reason 
to agree to a price adjustment the further along in performance the contract is. The 
tendency of the new R3RUE rule to motivate consensual modification depends on the 
performance progress of each contract under consideration. 
 The ‘reasonable value rule’ also produces a sliding scale of economic motivation 
but in the opposite direction: as the losing contract progresses, the gap between the 
winner’s expectation recovery and the loser’s ‘reasonable value’ recovery widens. If the 
size of the gap motivates action, then there is more motivation as the contract progresses 
towards full completion than there is at the start of the contract. This could supply more 
motivation for strategic action,
40
 or, as developed in the text, more motivation to adjust 
the contract rather than face the uncertainties of a breakdown followed by a dispute 
resolution process. Which incentives a given rule actually supplies to real people in these 
settings is ultimately an empirical question that, given the ‘noise’ of the situation, is not 
likely to be resolvable. 
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  Relational contracts gather inertia as performance advances and the parties sink 
tangible and intangible investments into its performance. If a rule can add anything at all 
to the pre-existing incentives of the parties in these complicated settings, then arguably a 
rule that increased incentives to keep the contract together as it gathers inertia would 
seem preferable to one that did the opposite.  
 R3RUE recognizes that it may not be possible to apply the ‘contract rate rule’ in 
all cases and, importantly, what the rule should be if that is not possible. Comment d 
provides, in part: 
 
By capping the damage calculation at the contract rate (where it can be determined), § 
38(2) prevents these plaintiffs as well from electing performance-based damages as a 
means of escape from an unfavorable bargain. 
 
This, of course, contributes substantial uncertainty to the rule’s application. 
 The new approach has undoubtedly added complexity to the analysis (in a real 
dispute, would the parties ever fail to contest what portion of the total work was actually 
completed?); if projected uncertainty in dispute resolution will motivate a contract 
adjustment to keep the contract together, the R3RUE approach might, ironically, supply 
the best motivation of all the rules. 
 It should be obvious that a rational actor analysis is highly indeterminate in this 
setting, not only because of the complexity of the relational contexts in which the parties 
will likely find themselves but also because the rational actor analysis itself depends on 
initial speculation about how people will actually behave in a given environment. 
Rational actor analysis of the kind described here typically assumes a rigorously self-
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 interested actor on whom economic incentives alone operate in a context-free 
environment. As suggested above, one can imagine a rational actor behaving in different 
ways in response to economic stimuli and, of course, the behaviour selected can control 
the ensuing analysis. The alternate rational actor just imagined responds to economic 
stimulation with co-operation rather than entirely self-interested strategizing.  
 
B.  Adding Empirical Observations to an Instrumental Analysis  
Is there any support beyond pure intuition for recasting the rational actor in the way just 
described? Following Macaulay, one might ask: ‘What would contracting parties actually 
do in this relational contract environment?’   
 We might be helped in this inquiry by behavioural economics, the discipline 
within the broad empirical tradition that Macaulay championed over 50 years ago that 
seeks answers to just these sorts of behavioural questions. Many studies conducted by 
these scholars have established that human beings do not respond to economic stimuli in 




 The older behavioural scholarship has attacked traditional economic analysis in its 
most basic assumptions. Shown either to be wrong or to be sufficiently inaccurate as to 
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 distort analysis are the assumptions that those making contracts can take into account 
enough factors to maximize their own utility, that they are realistic in their forecasts of 
the future, or that they are capable of using the available data to make decisions.
42
 While 
the empirical data supporting these attacks come largely from experimental studies of 
human behaviour, field observations made much earlier by Macaulay and others about the 
behaviour of those in business that use contracts in their work tend to corroborate more 
recent work.
43
    
 This scholarship has been remarkably provocative, but, like Macaulay’s, has not 
generally produced a positive normative agenda: if analysis begins with the proposition 
that people are not very rational, are not good planners, or are careless with their 
communications and commitments, it is hard to see what sorts of rules one might develop 
to serve them better. Put more specifically, the older researchers could convince us that 
our losing contractor might be ‘irrational’ (in a narrow rational actor sense), but could 
give little guidance into how (other than ‘irrationally’, in that same narrow sense) he 
might behave—or what might influence that behaviour—when embroiled in a contract 
that was losing money. The newer work may have more promise. 
 By designing experiments to test specific assumptions and rules in the law of 
contracts, the newer empirical researchers have gone beyond simply challenging 
economic ‘rationality’ itself to focusing on how real people actually behave when faced 
with contract problems. That research has identified a strong reciprocity norm
44
 affecting 
the behaviour of those who deal with one another, a norm whose effect is largely missing 
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 from the rational actor analysis so pervasive in the literature.
45
 Professor Dan Kahan has 
defined this in the context of public choice this way: 
 
The reciprocity theory holds that individuals in collective action settings behave not like 
rational wealth maximizers but rather like moral and emotional reciprocators. When they 
perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing to public goods, most 
individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do the same. When, 
in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, 
individuals are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own contributions and 
even to retaliate if possible. The reciprocity theory implies that because individuals 
behave in this fashion, the most effective means to promote cooperative behavior in 
collective action settings is to promote trust—the shared belief that others can in fact be 
counted on to contribute their fair share to public goods, whether or not doing so is in 
their material self-interest. Indeed, the reciprocity theory warns that incentives can often 
backfire by implying that most individuals are not inclined to contribute to collective 
goods voluntarily.  
 
This observation is closely related to Robert Axelrod’s experiments showing that a ‘tit for 
tat’ strategy that began with co-operation was the most successful and ‘profitable’ 
strategy for addressing the prisoner’s dilemma over the long run. The reciprocity norm, at 
its core, is relational and co-operative rather than individualist and self-interested.
46
 One 
can also see it as corroborating many of Macaulay’s and Macneil’s observations.  
 In one very provocative recent study,
47
 researchers examined how the reciprocity 
norm operated in the context of breach of contract. Their focus was on whether real 
persons care what the reason for a breach is and, if they do, how much they care and why. 
The researchers demonstrated that if the breach were the result of the breacher 
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 deliberately taking advantage of a better opportunity,
48
 the subjects would award higher 
damages than they would in a case where the breach were for reasons outside the 
breacher’s control. These findings are corroborated by others observing the behaviour of 
contracting parties in the field. 
 The researchers inferred from this behaviour that real people who had brought the 
reciprocity norm to contracting feel ‘suckered’, and seek to retaliate when that norm is 
violated by their contracting partner. The authors concede that the findings, while 
statistically significant, are preliminary.
49
 But the implications of the effects of an 
empirically observed reciprocity norm on contracting behaviour should be deeply 
disturbing to theorists who assume that no such value, dynamic, or motivation exists. For 
example, this empirically observed behaviour has the potential to undercut a core 
assumption of much economic analysis about contracts, that contracting parties are 
indifferent to whether they receive actual performance or expectation damages.
50
 This 
assumption is behind the largely discredited
51—but still widely discussed52—efficient 
breach paradigm and is a starting point for scores of articles that analyze contract damage 
rules through an instrumentalist analysis.   
 These newer findings may also have the potential for anchoring a less destructive, 
more positive normative effort at shaping rules to match the behaviour of those subject to 
them. Our hypothetical case here may be an example: if one took seriously the presence 
of a reciprocity norm within a relational contract, one might have empirical support for 
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 the proposition that our loser, when faced with performing a losing contract, would 
actually begin with an effort to negotiate, rather than with behaviour that was less 
relational and more self-centered and strategic. It might also support the proposition that, 
rather than rebuff such an encounter, the winner might well—and should—entertain it. 
Indeed, Axelrod’s findings on player strategies for addressing the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma,
53
 suggests that this contractor’s strategy—initial co-operation rather than 
‘defection’ in addressing the pricing within the contact—and the owner’s co-operation, is 
also the most effective in the long run. Researchers—even those working at the 
hypothetical level without rich factual context—who began with this different set of 
initial moves could understand the instrumental dynamics differently and, perhaps, begin 
a normative analysis that resonates better with observed contracting behaviour. 
 But while different initial assumptions might lead to different normative 
prescriptions, a main point of the foregoing discussion was to suggest that any 
prescriptive instrumental analysis of the incentives that might operate within a relational 
contract is fraught with problems. In the relational contract context particularly, it is very 
unlikely that instrumental analysis (whatever its initial assumptions about human 
behaviour) can point to any reliable policy prescriptions, even if one agreed that the goal 
was simply to produce an ‘efficient’ rule.   
 Where does this inconclusiveness lead one as a normative matter? It might well 
suggest that the wisest course for R3RUE would have been to defer (as did the Contracts 
Restatement) to the wisdom of the courts, situated as they have been in the thick context 
of these problems. Certainly the dominant case law and an accepted view of the goals of a 
‘restatement’ project54 could have justified leaving the Restatement of Contracts rule 
undisturbed. 
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III.  The Ideological Context for the New Rule 
 
While the reciprocity norm has enormous implications for contract theory, the complexity 
of a relational contract context makes an instrumental analysis that emphasizes the 
reciprocity norm subject to the same criticism as an instrumental analysis that emphasizes 
purely self-interested behaviour. The result of such inconclusiveness would suggest 
deference to the status quo in most instances. 
 In this Section we consider the losing contract problem from a different 
perspective. While assumptions about human behaviour can animate an instrumental 
analysis that can buttress one’s normative views about the losing contract rule, one’s 
views about the nature of contract law can also determine how one conceives of the 
problem and its solution. Here, again, reciprocity has powerful explanatory potential: it 
may help explain what may have happened between the restatement of the traditional rule 




 Embedded in R3RUE’s approach to the losing contract problem lies an adherence 
to a particular theory of contract law that leads to its sharp separation from the conception 
of restitution that animates the new Restatement. The two systems are conceived of as 
entirely separate and contract law is dominant.
56
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   R3RUE § 2 Comment c makes this clear: 
 
Contract is superior to restitution as a means of regulating voluntary transfers because it 
eliminates, or minimizes, the fundamental difficulty of valuation. Considerations of both 
justice and efficiency require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract 
whenever reasonably possible and that the parties’ own definition of their respective 
obligations–assuming the validity of their agreement by all pertinent tests–take 
precedence over the obligations that the law would impose in the absence of agreement. 
Restitution is accordingly subordinate to contract as an organizing principle of private 
relationships, and the terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of 




This means that if a situation involves an enforceable contract, then it must have a 
solution grounded in contract, and only in contract.   
 That particular conception of ‘contract law’ that supplies a ‘contract’ answer to 
any problem involving an enforceable contract is itself a particular one that sees the field 
as coextensive with ‘promise’58 or, alternatively, ‘consent’.59 Once the problem is defined 
as having an enforceable contractual underpinning, then liability should not go beyond the 
‘promise’ made by the breacher or beyond her consent to liability as represented by the 
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 promise. Harm to the plaintiff, if it goes beyond the promisor’s commitment, might be 
important but is subordinate to the higher principle of limiting the promisor’s liability to 
the value of the promise. In this way, a promise may serve primarily as a limit to the 
individual promisor’s liability rather than as a reciprocal commitment to one’s contracting 
partner. And expectation damages, being ultimately based on the value of the promise 
(rather than harm done through breach), becomes a cardinal component in this vision. In 
the losing contract setting, giving the loser-plaintiff a remedy that exceeds the value one 
calculates based on the breacher’s promise would, it is said, ‘unjustly enrich’ the plaintiff, 
presumably by giving the loser plaintiff more than he bargained for,
60
 or exposing the 
promisor to more liability than she assumed.
61
 This view of contract accords great respect 
to personal autonomy and freedom, both to make contracts and, importantly in this 
context, from liability not voluntarily assumed. It tends to regard contract almost solely as 
a mechanism to shift risk rather than as a mechanism to shift risk and accomplish 
something through joint effort. Reciprocity, and the context that reciprocity gives to the 
act of making a commitment, has relatively little to do with it. 
 But there is, and probably always has been, a competing normative vision of the 
institution of contract, one based on the relational bond formed in many contracts, 
empirically observed by Macaulay and scores of others.
62
 In this view, once a contract is 
made, the contracting parties owe one another ‘more’ than the quantifiable measure of 
their respective promises. One can express that ‘more’ in a number of ways: the trust 
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 formed in the relationship,
63
 the sense of mutual reliance the contract represents, ‘organic 
solidarity’,64 ‘morality’,65 or (in the language of contemporary researchers) the obligation 
inferred from the ‘reciprocity norm’. The importance of reciprocity in contracting has 
been described by philosophers
66
 and, as briefly developed above, has been identified 
empirically in contemporary studies of co-operative and contract behaviour.
67
   
By definition, reciprocity adds to the act of promising the context in which each 
individual promise is made; the norm tends towards a ‘compensatory’ rather than a 
‘promissory’ view of contract remedies, one that would seek to compensate for harm 
done to the promissee unless competing policies suggested limitations. Expectation 
damages, in this view, serve not as a bulwark against expanded promisor liability and 
essential to one’s vision of the institution of contract, but as an efficient surrogate for 
compensating for the harm that one’s breach causes another, one that encourages business 




 These different views of the rationale for the expectation measure of damages in 
turn can lead to a difference in one’s view of the importance of the original bargain once 
it has been broken. If one’s promise serves also as a core principle of limited liability, 
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 then breach should never expand that liability beyond the value we place on that promise. 
Thus, promise is not an act that can, if breached, inflict harm that must be compensated 
but, rather, it is an assumption of limited liability. A more reciprocal view of the 
institution places promissory harm nearer to the centre
69
 and might downgrade the 
breacher’s original promise as having much limiting value once she has breached that 
promise. At least in relational contract settings, perhaps one surrenders one’s right to the 
benefit of the bargain when one breaches that bargain.   
 One can get a good sense of the contrasting perspectives on the connection 
between breach and the original bargain in R3RUE’s commentary about Bush v 
Canfield,
70
 a well-known restitution case where the loser had made a down payment of 
$5,000 in a goods contract where the contract price was $14,000 and the goods turned out 
to be worth only $11,000. The seller breached by non-delivery and subsequently resisted 
the loser’s claim for the $5,000 down payment, maintaining that the loser’s loss on the 
bargain should be deducted leaving the buyer’s refund claim at $2,000. The court rejected 
this proposition. This outcome seems very intuitive and nearly self-evident. But how one 
explains it can reflect powerfully the vision one has for contract law. 
 R3RUE would follow precedent and permit Bush to get his $5,000 back, 
undiminished by the consequences of his bad bargain. It does so through its remedy in 
Section 37 called ‘rescission’. But it seems to be a grudging acceptance of this universally 
followed precedent, embraced by the Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code since its 
inception.
71
 Comment b to R3RUE § 37 explains: 
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 In theory, and on rare occasions in practice, rescission pursuant to § 37 permits a plaintiff 
who has paid in advance for a defaulted performance to recover an amount exceeding 
compensatory damages. See Illustrations 1–2 [Illustration 2 uses the essential facts of 
Bush v Canfield]. Such outcomes are rare, because a prepaid seller will almost never 
forfeit a profit that might be earned, at the seller’s option, by performing the contract or 
simply releasing the buyer. The striking results of Illustrations 1–2 are the fortuitous 
consequence of the law’s adherence to a simple rule rather than a complex one. The 
simple rule is that a plaintiff who seeks only the return of a prepaid price, or return of 
property in specie, will not (for reasons of both fairness and economy) be put to the 
burden of proving damages from the defendant’s breach. There is no comparable windfall 
to the plaintiff if the sequence of performance is reversed because rescission is not 
available as a remedy for a payment default.
72 
 
Note the underlying assumptions: that expectation damages (derived from the original 
bargain) are compensatory; that allowing the plaintiff to recover in excess of the bargain 
is ‘striking’; and that damages in excess of expectation are a ‘windfall’.  
 In this vision, the contract once struck has permanently shifted the risk, survives 
intact, and is independent of performance; breach—and the violation of the reciprocity 
norm that breach may represent—has little or no role to play. Indeed, but for the 
administrative convenience that produced Bush v Canfield’s ‘striking windfall’, one 
would imagine a policy view that would hard-wire the deal Bush and Canfield stuck and 
return to Bush only the $2,000 that was left after deducting his self-inflicted loss on the 
bargain.   
 One holding such a strong view of the significance of the original—but 
breached—bargain might also question or reject the proposition suggested earlier that, 
were the loser to approach the winner in the midst of performance for a concession, the 
best outcome would be an adjusted contract. Having played the game at contract 
formation, for all intents and purposes, the game is over. Having legitimately ‘won’ at the 
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 outset by making a good bargain, the winner should have little reason to make a 
concession to the loser.   
 Apart from the convenience of remedy, should the fact of breach itself matter in 
Bush v Canfield? A sharply contrasting vision of Bush can be seen in the work of 
Professor George Palmer, a well-known and dominant voice in restitution in the mid to 
late twentieth century, who wrote a full-throated defensece of the traditional losing 
contract rule eventually embraced by Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373: 
 
Certainly on those facts it is difficult to see the justice of allowing the seller to retain 
$3,000 of the amount received from the buyer, on the plea that the buyer would have lost 
this amount if the seller had performed a contract which in fact he did not perform. The 
seller gave nothing in exchange for the $3,000 except a broken promise and the principle 
of unjust enrichment surely is applicable. If the buyer had made no payment and had been 
the party who repudiated the contract, the seller could have recovered $3,000 damages 
for loss of his bargain. It would be curious indeed for the seller to obtain the same 




Significantly, the Reporter’s view, compared to Professor Palmer’s, is quite different:  
 
In reality, however, the seller ‘gave’ the essence of what he undertook to give: He made 
himself liable for flour for future delivery, at a fixed price, giving the buyer an 
enforceable right to any profit that might be produced by a market advance. In exchange, 
the seller obtained the mirror-image to the buyer’s contractual position: an enforceable 
right to any profit produced by a market decline. Because the seller’s risk was the price of 
the seller’s potential profit, it can hardly be said that the seller, having borne the risk, is 
unjustly enriched if he obtains the reward.
74
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Contract, in this latter view, is a matter of individual risk-taking and risk-fixing that 
occurs at contract formation. The parties are each betting against one another rather than 
trying to accomplish something through collective effort. The values set at this point are 
largely immutable and expectation damages are the full equivalent of a contract 
performed rather than breached. This view may be sound with respect to bets or swaps 
where there is no performance contemplated other than the payoff; it becomes 
increasingly implausible as contracts proceed from bets to highly relational contracts such 
as construction contracts. 
 In Palmer’s vision of contract remedies, breach matters; a promise that is breached 
is different from a promise that has not been breached. If one views the return of the full 
prepayment as ‘extra’ compensation, or as ‘supracompensatory’ to the party who has 
made a losing bargain,
75
 perhaps this is in implicit recognition (and a form of 
quantification) of the reciprocity norm that was violated by the defendant. It should 
matter little whether the loser gave cash or services prior to the winner’s breach. And, 
since the losing plaintiff seeks only the value of what the defendant received, not 
necessarily his entire reliance expenditure, the winner is protected against the unlimited 
and unascertainable risk that a reliance-damages-without-deduction rule would supply.
 In giving strong lip service to the contract-as-liability-limit position, the thrust of 
the commentary to R3RUE’s rules gives a primacy to contract law,76 tends to enshrine the 
original bargain of the parties (and the limitations to liability that the bargain might 
provide), and tends to reduce the significance of breach in actually altering the economic 
exchange created when the parties struck their contract. In that respect, R3RUE echoes 
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 the sentiments of modern scholars who lean heavily on law and economics analysis and 
who are inclined toward a non-reciprocal, contract-as-promise vision of contract law. 
 Beginning with the free market economic theories championed principally by the 
University of Chicago (and marketed by its most vociferous spokesperson, Milton 
Friedman), the related political rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the 
relentless outpouring of judicial opinions and academic writing by Richard Posner, those 
views have been promoted on many fronts, have gained considerable ground since the 
mid 1970s, and may well dominate contemporary contract scholarship. The less 
individualist, more reciprocal way that earlier scholars thought and wrote about contract 
problems provided a context for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts; the work of later 
scholars provided a context for R3RUE. To even the casual observer, the context against 
which we think about contract law has changed dramatically during the last 25 years and 
it would be surprising if this context did not affect how contract law is perceived. While 
this cannot offer normative support for the new losing contract rule, it certainly 
contributes to our understanding of how it came to be. 
 
IV.  How Might the New Rule Fare in the Courts? 
 
The driving forces behind the new losing contract rule appear to have been instrumental 
analyses suggesting that the pre-existing rule was inefficient and a view of contract law 
that saw the breacher’s promise (as quantified by the expectation damages system) as 
providing limitations on the liability that a breacher should shoulder for breaching a 
contract. Section II suggested that the instrumental effect of contract rules depends on the 
contractual context, that their operation as incentives in relational contract settings may 
range from non-existent to extremely small, and in both cases are likely drowned out by 
other forces. That Section also suggested that instrumental analysis in this context is, in 
 any event, extremely malleable and critically depends on assumptions about complex 
human behaviour for its predictive power. Actual, empirically-based human behaviour 
may well be different than (or in some cases, perhaps opposite to) that assumed by those 
supporting a change in the traditional rule and might well support the older rule itself. 
That Section concluded by suggesting that an instrumental analysis in this highly-
relational context was sufficiently inconclusive as to actually suggest support for the old 
rule, developed as it was by courts working in the complex contexts that are assumed 
away in the process of creating a normative instrumental analysis. 
 Section III argued that a particular vision of contract law and of its primacy over 
overlapping systems (here, the restitution system) may have driven the rule change, 
despite case law that remained essentially unchanged. But views of what contract law ‘is’ 
change, with a ‘contract-as-promise’ view dominating the late nineteenth century into the 
early twentieth,
77
 a far fuzzier view ushered in by the legal realists that included (thanks 
to Ian Macneil and Stewart Macaulay among others) a recognition of ‘contract as relation’ 
that gained many adherents during the twentieth century, and a re-awakened ‘contract-as-
promise’ view gathering momentum in the 1980s. It may not be easy to form an apolitical 
normative judgment about the losing contract rule when that judgment is inevitably and 
perhaps imperceptibly affected by our ideological beliefs about what contract law (which 
turns out, to the surprise of many, to be extremely value-laden) should do. 
 This Section considers the question of whether the new rule will be embraced by 
the courts in the kinds of cases where it will arise. It will also briefly consider whether the 
new rule might have effects outside the litigation system.  
 The ‘contract rate rule’ proposed in R3RUE has been around for a very long time, 
is intuitively satisfying, and is probably quite well known. But nonetheless it has been 
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 widely rejected by twentieth-century courts.
78
 The staying power in the courts of the 
traditional ‘reasonable value rule’ is its central puzzle. If R3RUE’s solution will prove 
unattractive to judges deciding complex cases, the ‘contract rate rule’ may ultimately fail 
to gain judicial adherents and thereby become dead letter. This may be particularly true 
where there is ample precedent in the case law and support in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts for the older approach. In our system, the pressure of work provides strong 
incentives to judges to follow precedent rather than attempt to explain why a new rule is 
better. 
 Despite the primacy-of-contract rhetoric in R3RUE’s commentary,79 as developed 
earlier, the ‘contract rate rule’ proposed in § 38 actually does take breach (and some of 
Professor Palmer’s view)80 into account, albeit in a complex way. Section 38(2)(b) 
provides that a plaintiff may recover for breach of contract: 
 
(b) the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual performance, not 
exceeding the price of such performance as determined by reference to the 
parties’ agreement.81 
 
When the plaintiff sues for reasonable value conferred, this provision limits the plaintiff 
to the proportion of the total price represented by the amount of work actually done under 
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 the contract. To the extent the loser had perverse incentives to induce the winner to 
breach—so he could get a better recovery than would be the case if he were found to be 
the breacher—those remain incentives under the new rule (since the recovery still 
depends on who is held to be the breacher), but to a lesser extent. 
 In amplifying this compromise rule, the commentary explains: 
 
If the rule were otherwise (so that … the whole of the plaintiff’s expected loss from 
performance were deducted from the value of his interrupted performance), the defendant 
would be in the position of imposing a unilateral modification or novation, on the terms 





While this compromise position may be intuitively appealing and the rule is found in 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code for goods contracts, nearly all of which are 
easily divisible,
83
 the context in which these cases are likely to come up suggest serious 
problems with the apportionment required to apply the new rule. Indeed, it seems quite 
likely that the new rule cannot easily be applied at all in the relational settings where it 
will be called on to perform.  
 Even in those construction contract cases where some unit rate is stated, a real-
world context would suggest that the parties did not intend to apportion their actual 
performances in the way the stated rate might suggest. In making this point, Professor 
Palmer wrote:  
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 Almost without exception such contracts are treated as entire … This is true even though 
the whole contract price is based on a price for each unit of work done and the units are 
capable of precise measurement, for example, so much for each running foot of street 
graded or each yard of earth excavated. It is evident that this recognizes the realities of 
the business arrangement—it is not likely, for example, that a contractor would arrange 
his working schedules and marshal his labor force and equipment at the site to grade one 




While the R3RUE rule may be intuitively satisfying, apportioning the contract price when 
the parties’ agreement does not lend itself to divisability seems both intrusive and a 
violation of the parties’ intent. Their contract was for an entire performance for an entire 
price, not the fraction of either. Perhaps this can partially explain why Kehoe v 
Rutherford,
85
 a very well-known case
86
 that used a percentage rule, and on which the 
R3RUE rule is based, was not widely followed in the twentieth century. In complex cases, 
the apportionment approach will be very difficult to implement
87
 and will likely be no 
truer to the parties supposed intent than is the traditional rule that simply awards 
reasonable value. The commentary to the new rule seems to recognize this and suggests 
that, when apportionment is not possible, courts should simply cap the reasonable value 
recovery with the contract price.
88
 
 This may suggest that the real rule that will be available in the complex 
environments that gave rise to the traditional rule is the contract ‘price-cap rule’, not the 
more intuitively-satisfying ‘contract rate rule’ supported by the commentary to R3RUE § 
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 38(2)(b). This ‘price-cap rule’ rests on the normative proposition that the winner should 
never be required to pay more than was explicitly agreed to in the contract. 
 But capping a reasonable value award by the contract price is even less true to the 
parties’ supposed intent. Indeed, allowing reasonable value up to the contract price, while 
true to a policy of protecting the winner from paying more than she explicitly promised 
for the whole performance, may be otherwise incoherent. The big-loser plaintiff who has 
conferred a small part of the bargained-for benefit receives the same recovery (the 
contract price) as the small-loser plaintiff who has conferred a much larger part of the 
work. While one cannot know why an intuitively satisfying Kehoe rule was not widely 
embraced by the courts, one reason may be that, when faced with the complexities of 
litigation involving partially-performed contracts, the Kehoe rule was simply unworkable 
and the alternative of capping a reasonable value award with the contract price seemed an 
even less satisfying judicial response to the winner’s breach of contract than the 
traditional, uncapped, alternative. 
 While the inertia of the past (and precedent) might suggest that modern courts, 
too, might reject the new rule, it is hazardous to project twenty-first century judicial 
receptivity from twentieth-century decisions. Section 38 will give modern courts some 
secondary authority to cap a recovery at the contract price, though the main explanation 
for the rule is the far more satisfying (to some) contract-rate rule. And while the price-cap 
outcome is (perhaps) the least coherent approach when measured against likely party 
intent, it may be appealing to courts who would view contract as a liability-limiting 
device. Our courts are also a product of our modern times and might well be more 
receptive to a contract-as-promise view of the situation than were earlier courts that 
considered expectation damages as simply one of many ways the legal system might 
legitimately respond to a breach of contract.  
 What about the effects of the new rule those who perform contracts? It seems 
extremely unlikely that the parties to the kinds of contracts involved here will know of the 
 new rule, at least until the first case is litigated and the new rule implemented within it. 
But even if they were to know of the new rule, and even if the new rule’s incentive effects 
(whatever they may be) were not overwhelmed by the other motivational forces operating 
in the context of these complex contracts, the parties’ strategic decision-making within 
their contract has actually been further complicated by the new rule. As before, it will be 
extraordinarily difficult for the parties to an ongoing relational contract to predict who the 
court will hold to be the first material breacher (and under the new rule, it will still 
matter). With the announced new rule, it will also be very difficult to predict which rule 
(‘reasonable value rule’, ‘price-capped rule’, or ‘contract rate rule’) the court will use 
once it decides the material breach question. The added uncertainty may have the 
paradoxical effect of keeping relational contracts together by making what will happen if 
either party withdraws even more unpredictable.
89
 While it would not be a welcome 
conclusion for those who laboured hard to find the ‘right’ solution to the losing contract 
problem, on this basis one might perhaps proclaim the rule ‘a success’. 
 For the contract system more generally, ‘success’ will be in the eye of the 
beholder. Quite clearly the new rule further enshrines a particular view of contract law 
and, in the process, contributes to the marketing of that view. Those who already hold 
that view will applaud this affirmation of their view, and those now being educated will 
see additional evidence that it is the way to think about contract law.   
 But the fascination of this subject is that there always are, and always have been, 
more ways than one to look at it. In concluding this Section, it is worth recalling a famous 
passage from Grant Gilmore’s The Death of Contract:   
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 If, by chance, the parties knew about the uncertainty that would follow if one or the other breached the 
contract, they might well liquidate damages or limit liability at the outset, an outcome that would be seen by 
many as the best alternative.   
 We have become used to the idea that, in literature and the arts, there are alternating 
rhythms of classicism and romanticism. During classical periods, which are, typically, of 
brief duration, everything is neat, tidy and logical; theorists and critics reign supreme; 
formal rules of structure and composition are stated to the general acclaim … But the 
classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly breaks down in a protracted 
romantic agony. The romantics spurn the exquisitely stated rules of the preceding period; 
they experiment, they improvise; they deny the existence of any rules; they churn around 
in an ecstasy of self-expression. At the height of a romantic period, everything is 
confused, sprawling, formless and chaoticas well as, frequently, extremely interesting. 
Then, the romantic energy having spent itself, there is a new classical 
reformulationand so the rhythms continue.90 
 
We have probably been in another ‘classical period’ since the 1980s, but we now have a 
new generation of researchers, following Macaulay’s lead, who are challenging 
theoretical conclusions with real-world observations. There will be, no doubt, many 
candidates in the new generation of empirical scholars for the title ‘Lord High 
Executioner of the Contract is Dead Movement’ that Gilmore conferred on Macaulay at 
the start of his book.
91




Stewart Macaulay began his long career with a 1959 article that wondered whether the 
law of restitution could be understood without its context. From that first effort, he 
proceeded to a career—and helped begin a tradition—of empirical examination of the 
many contexts in which the law is used. His many studies might well be described as 
unsettling: repeatedly, they suggest that real parties in real situations do not behave as the 
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 ‘rational’ people we might hope, imagine or hypothesize them to be. Reading Macaulay 
would make one scoptical that theory could ever accurately capture or describe a coherent 
picture, or that rules could have reliably predictable effects on those they aim to affect. 
 This examination of the losing contract rules—the traditional one found in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the new one found in the new Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution—extends Macaulay’s call for ‘context’ in an effort both to better 
understand why the rule changed, and to predict whether it will be a successful change. It 
has suggested that the normative case for the new rule is, ultimately, contingent on 
behavioural predictions that may be false, and on an idea of contract law that is debatable 
and perhaps ideological. On this basis, one could argue that the proponents of change 
have not met their normative burden, and that the courts who have worked in the thicket 
of relational contracts are more likely to have got it ‘right’ than have the theorists.   
The new complexity that the added rules contribute to predicting legal outcomes 
may have the effect of dampening party enthusiasm for ending their contracts and, 
instead, prompting them to work things out rather than resort to litigation. However one 
views that as an outcome, it may mean that we will not know for a long time whether the 
new rule will be well-received or rejected in the courts.
92
 And given the cyclical nature of 
our views of contract law and of the expanding work of Macaulay-inspired empiricists, 
the ‘contract law’ that has been the predicate and context for the R3RUE rule may be 
‘dead’ before we find out. 
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